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SHRINKING THE POST-PLENARY POWER PROBLEM
Michael Kagan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Matthew J. Lindsay’s excellent article Disaggregating
“Immigration Law” arrives at a pivotal moment in the evolution of
American immigration law.1 My understanding of this moment is thus:
A majority of Supreme Court justices appear to be at least occasionally
uneasy with the plenary power doctrine that has shaped immigration law
since the Chinese Exclusion Case,2 but they are not all sure how to live
without it either.3 So long as this remains the case, the Court’s
immigration jurisprudence is likely to be incrementally favorable to
immigrants on the whole, but tentative, inconsistent, and incoherent in
some important ways. In my view, the importance of Professor
Lindsay’s intervention is that it helps point a way to find clarity in this
transitional period.
Since the 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,4 the Supreme Court
has appeared increasingly willing to defend immigrants’ due process
rights vis-à-vis federal immigration authorities. The Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky5 undermines the formalistic distinction between
criminal punishments and supposedly civil immigration enforcement, a
distinction that had long been invoked to prevent immigrants from
claiming more procedural rights when they face deportation. In addition
to these two landmark cases, the Court has issued a series of decisions
strengthening the categorical approach to interpreting criminal grounds
of removal, in effect limiting the executive branch’s power to broadly
construe deportation powers.6 Finally, the Court has invoked federalism
to block some state-level anti-immigrant legislation.7
But there are other winds blowing. A majority of the justices recently
refused to apply meaningful scrutiny to the denial of a spousal visa
based on opaque security grounds, even though the denial threatened a
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1. Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2016).
2. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
3. See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22–23, 26–27 (2015).
4. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
5. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990–91 (2015); Moncrieffe v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690, 1692, 1693–94 (2013).
7. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012).
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U.S. citizen’s family unity.8 But the justices could not agree on a single
rationale to explain that decision.9 Most recently, the depleted Court
divided 4-4 about the propriety of President Barack Obama’s deferred
action programs.10 These decisions are strong indications that the
justices remain divided and perhaps a bit unsure about some central
issues in immigration law.11
Even if I am right that many justices have doubts about plenary
power, the sheer vastness of immigration law is a challenge for any
judicial project aimed at getting rid of it. Some immigration cases
involve substantive legal grounds for deporting people from the United
States.12 Some involve due process rights of people who are detained
before deportation.13 Some involve eligibility for asylum.14 Some
involve requests for visas for family members abroad.15 Some involve
companies in the United States that want to import specialized
workers.16 Some involve questions about the limits of Presidential
power to shape immigration policy.17 Some involve questions about the
limits of state power to shape immigration policy.18 And that’s just a
8. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (plurality opinion).
9. See id. at 2138–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015).
11. In the 2016-2017 term, the Court will hear more cases that will provide another
reading on the current status of plenary power—potentially including the question of whether
plenary power remains relevant at all. For example, Jennings v. Rodriguez involves an extension
of due process to people detained for more than six months while their immigration cases are
pending. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136
S.
Ct.
2489
(2016);
see
also
Jennings
v.
Rodriguez,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jennings-v-rodriguez/?wpmp_switcher=desktop
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016). Lynch v. Morales-Santana revisits the question of whether
Congress may treat mothers and fathers differently in the conferral of citizenship to foreign-born
children. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 523–24 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016); see also Lynch v. Morales-Santana, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lynch-v-morales-santana/?wpmp_switcher=desktop
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
12. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–84 (2013) (holding that
conviction under a state statute that was punishable as a misdemeanor in certain circumstances
was not equivalent to a federal felony for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act);
Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 3689050
(2016).
13. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriquez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting writ of certiorari).
14. See, e.g., INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449–50 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2196–97 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Fogo de Chao v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d
134 (5th Cir. 2015).
18. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012); Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011).
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partial list. The plenary power doctrine, broadly understood, has caused
many problems. But it has the virtue of being a broad theory capable of
guiding the resolution of all of these cases, even if it resolves them in
problematic ways. Developing a replacement theory that can do similar
work is daunting, which may make justices hesitant to entirely discard
the devil we know, so to speak.
II. THE APPEAL OF DISAGGREGATION
Professor Lindsay argues that there were originally many
splintered laws, mostly at the state level, that impacted non-citizens.19
These laws became federalized and to some extent unified under the
rubric of plenary power, creating what we think of as immigration law.20
But the justifications for a broad plenary power doctrine have long been
questionable. In particular, Professor Lindsay highlights the fact that
federal authority over foreign affairs and national security is not a
helpful guidepost for many of the specific, practical questions that arise
in daily practice of this thing we call immigration.21 In a narrow sense,
these insights are not entirely new. For instance, other scholars have
observed that the Supreme Court has probably overstated the foreign
affairs dimension of immigration policy.22 But as I see it, the importance
of Professor Lindsay’s intervention is not in questioning the reach of the
foreign affairs rationale. It is that he takes the next logical step by
questioning whether immigration law should have a single coherent
rationale in the first place. While Professor Lindsay focuses on foreign
affairs, this logic is farther reaching because it suggests that only by
disaggregating immigration can we correctly account for the importance
of foreign affairs, national security, civil liberties, economic policy, and
the many other policy interests that play a role in regulating noncitizens. In this sense, Professor Lindsay’s most important argument is
really right in the title: “Immigration Law” is in quotes.
Another way to think of this would be to say that many different
bodies of law impact non-citizens in particular ways. These disparate
bodies of law together are known as “immigration law,” but perhaps the
only thing they really share is that they all affect non-citizens. It may be
19. See Lindsay, supra note 1, at 22.
20. See id. at 32.
21. See id. at 41.
22. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens and the
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1594 (1997) (arguing that a shift to foreign affairs
rationales supported a nationalization of immigration law, but that the importance of foreign
affairs can be overstated); Peter J. Spiro, Rebuttal, State Action on Immigration (Bad and Good)
After Arizona v. United States, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 107 (2012) (questioning the
Supreme Court’s invocation of a broad foreign affairs power to justify preemption of state
immigration measures).
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a mistake to assume that they are one coherent legal system in the
manner of torts law or criminal procedure. We understand that a
decision in a traffic accident case might refine the concept of
negligence, and thus impact a workplace injury case. We understand that
a search and seizure decision in drug trafficking prosecution could later
have ramifications in a larceny case. But we should not assume that a
decision imposing constitutional limitations on detention of non-citizens
in the United States necessarily changes the law about whether a person
on the other side of the world can obtain a spousal visa to come here.
We should thus not be surprised that the justices in the majority in Kerry
v. Din23 failed to even cite Zadvydas v. Davis.24 These cases both deal
with non-citizens, but they deal with non-citizens who are in very
different situations, implicating very different interests, rights, and
constitutional concerns. In this way, immigration law should be
disaggregated.
It seems to me that a strong piece of evidence in favor of
disaggregation is the way Congress has fragmented the regulation of
immigration across many different federal agencies. Immigration law
casebooks include elaborate organizational charts attempting to depict
the ways in which different aspects of this body (or bodies) of law are
administered by USCIS, ICE, CBP, the Department of Justice (EOIR),
the Department of Labor, and the Department of State, among others.25
Perhaps what we really have is a Law of Citizenship, a Law of Entry
and Admission, a Law of Removal, a Law of Family Unity, a Law of
Foreign Labor Regulation, and so on. There are probably many potential
ways to disaggregate immigration and I will not attempt to develop a
precise taxonomy here. The point is simply that by breaking
immigration into narrower bodies of law, each focused on a unique
context and set of concerns, the difficult legal problems should become
easier to manage.
III. THE EXCEPTIONALISM TEMPTATION
A counterpoint to Professor Lindsay’s thesis may be found in a
similarly important study by Professors David S. Rubenstein and
Pratheepan Gulasekaram.26 Their article starts from a premise that is
common to most critiques of plenary power: that immigration has often
been treated differently for constitutional purposes than other areas of
23. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
24. See generally id. But see id. at 2144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Zadvydas in
support of procedural due process).
25. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 5 (5th ed. 2009).
26. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730956.
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law.27 But they rebuke immigration scholars for sometimes opposing
exceptionalism and sometimes invoking it so as to achieve particular
results.28 Thus, scholars who want to discard plenary power with regard
to immigrants’ civil liberties are all too willing to invoke it if it helps
strike down Arizona’s anti-immigrant legislation at the state level, or
defend President Obama’s deferred action programs.29 Professors
Rubenstein and Gulasekaram argue that for constitutional purposes, the
civil liberties, federalism, and separation of powers problems of
immigration law cannot be neatly partitioned from each other.30 They
argue that immigration law poses a constitutional “trilemma” because it
requires accounting for each of these different problems through a
holistic approach.31 Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram thus argue
that disaggregation is not easily accomplished, and not necessarily
wise.32
A signal of this lurking danger can be seen in the frequent citation of
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC)33 in
support of President Obama’s use of deferred action.34 AADC contains
strong endorsement of prosecutorial discretion, which is why it is a
convenient authority for backers of expanded deferred action.35 But as I
have explored in more detail elsewhere, AADC is an awful decision
from the standpoint of immigrants’ civil liberties.36 It seems to endorse
executive discretion in immigration enforcement to such an extreme
extent that it would permit infringement of First Amendment liberties
(although there are ways to read the decision more narrowly).37
The solution, it seems to me, is to reconcile these two theses, which
on the surface appear to be in conflict. It is important that Professors
27. See id. at 1.
28. See id. at 4–5, 24.
29. See id. at 28, 31.
30. See id. at 42–44, 51–53. Professor Lindsay appears to acknowledge that
disaggregation of immigration law, especially narrowing the foreign affairs justification, may
complicate preemption arguments against state immigration measures. See Lindsay, supra note
1, at n.258.
31. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 42–43.
32. See id. at 53.
33. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
34. See, e.g., Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law,
UCLA School of Law, et al., to President Barack Obama, 1 n.2, (May 28, 2012),
https://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief28May2012with
Signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3EE-YGNW] (quoting AADC).
35. AADC, 525 U.S. at 483–84 (“[T]he INS may decline to institute proceedings,
terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. . . . A case may be
selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process.”).
36. See Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen
Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1266–69, 1278–83 (2016).
37. See id. at 1266–69.
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Rubenstein and Gulasekaram do not oppose immigration
exceptionalism per se. Rather, if I may try to paraphrase, they critique
exceptionalism of convenience. They warn against taking a particular
position in a specific immigration case without accounting for the
unintended doctrinal impact in other immigration cases. As I see it, the
problem is that this is easier said than done. “Immigration law,” as
conventionally conceived, is so vast that it may be difficult for lawyers
and judges to successfully account for all of the potential doctrinal
implications of moving one way or another in a particular case. The
daunting nature of this problem can lead the Court in two unsatisfactory
directions. The Court can fall back on the old, well-established but
deeply problematic plenary power doctrine.38 Or the Court can issue
decisions that appear to deviate from established norms without
explaining clearly if the Court really means to do so. This latter
approach causes considerable confusion for practitioners and lower
courts, but for the Supreme Court it has the virtue of maximizing
flexibility and minimizing unintended consequences.39
By pushing immigration law toward disaggregation, I believe
Professor Lindsay makes this problem considerably less daunting
because it suggests a manageable way to address the doctrinal spillovers
that Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram warn of. The key is to find
principled means by which to determine which immigration cases are
inexorably linked and which maybe severed from each other
doctrinally. The way to do this, it seems to me, is to be clear that
disaggregation makes sense in terms of subject matter. A case
concerning the interpretation of a statutory provision on family
sponsorship is a different subject than a constitutional challenge to longterm pre-removal detention of immigrants. One case need not
necessarily affect the other, which liberates justices to decide the cases
in front of them without undue concern about unforeseen problems.
This is the strength of Professor Lindsay’s argument and it is
convincing so long as the cases really deal with different subjects.
The critique posed by Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram is at
its most convincing when immigration cases involve a similar subject.
We see this if we look at the cases of Zadvydas v. Davis,40 Arizona v.
38. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 1239–41
(2015), can be seen as an example of this problematic approach.
39. An example of this phenomenon may be seen in the Court’s recent failure—without
explanation—to invoke Chevron deference in cases concerning criminal grounds of removal, a
failure that has been explained by the fact formally abandoning Chevron is a hard doctrinal
choice that not all justices may be yet ready to make. See Asher Steinberg, Torres v. Lynch—A
Sub Silento Holding on Chevron Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Criminal Law?,
THE
NARROWEST
GROUNDS,
(June
1,
2016,
12:18
AM),
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/torres-v-lynch-sub-silentio-holding-on.html.
40. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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United States41 and United States v. Texas,42 three cases which embody
the “trilemma” that Professors Rubenstein and Gulasekaram identify.43
In a narrow sense, each of these cases asks a different question. One is
about due process, one is about pre-emption doctrine, and one is about
executive power. But all three of these cases concern immigration
enforcement inside the United States. They share a common subject
matter. Thus, doctrinal changes in one are likely to impact the others.
Disaggregation among these cases is tempting for advocates who want
to reach particular results. But there is a much greater risk of rendering
the doctrine incoherent, or of producing unforeseen and undesirable
results.
IV. SEARCHING FOR NEW ANALOGIES
In theory, the erosion of plenary power should lead to a
corresponding erosion of immigration exceptionalism. The trouble is
that if immigration is not unique, then it must be similar to something
else. The decline of plenary power demands new analogies. If the goal
is to normalize immigration law, an apparently useful set of tools
appears to be offered by administrative law. Immigration law is usually
seen as a species of administrative law.44 It is comprised of a set of
complicated, often ambiguous statutes that are interpreted and applied
by a set of executive agencies. Major rules of administrative law, such
as National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services45 deference, thus feature prominently in many
immigration decisions.46 Professor Alina Das has observed that federal
authorities now often invoke Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.47 deference to shield their decisions from judicial
scrutiny, where in the past they might have been able to rely on plenary
power.48
On the surface, application of Chevron deference often seems
completely appropriate in immigration cases.49 Administrative law’s
deference doctrines work best when there is an ambiguous statute
41. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
42. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. See Jill E. Family, DAPA and the Future of Immigration Law as Administrative Law,
55 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 89 (2015).
45. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
46. See, e.g., Matter of Fajarado Espinoza, 26 I&N Dec 603, 605 (BIA 2015); Matter of
Alfonso Cortes Medina, 26 I&N Dec. 79, 81 (BIA 2013); Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46, 49
(BIA 2012).
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. See Alina Das, Unshacking Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 163–64 (2015).
49. See id. at 148.
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offering more than one reasonable policy choice, in which case it makes
sense to defer to a branch of government that has more technical policy
expertise and more accountability to the public.50 Chevron deference
also is a means by which the courts try to enforce congressional intent
to allow agencies to have discretion about how to apply ambiguous
statutes.51
But it is not clear that these rationales are strong enough to defend
judicial deference in certain kinds of immigration cases. Professor Das
has highlighted the problem that application of Chevron in immigration
detention cases produces disturbing results because it limits judicial
review in cases involving physical liberty and “operates as a
presumption in favor of detention.”52 Recently I participated in an
intriguing debate about why the Court has not cited Chevron in several
recent cases interpreting ambiguous criminal grounds of removal.53 This
apparent inconsistency can feed a continuing sense that immigration is
just different, though it doesn’t tend to produce a sense of coherency—
in large part because the Supreme Court has yet to explain why it
invokes Chevron in some cases, but not in others. It may be that some
justices are uneasy with deferring to the political branches when
physical liberty is at stake, but they are unsure how to explain this, since
there are other immigration cases where such deference would not be so
problematic.
Disaggregation can be helpful to bring some order to this apparent
muddle. It teaches us to not assume that all cases involving non-citizens
must be resolved using common legal doctrines. Instead, we should
look at the specific concerns raises by different contexts. Cases that
involve putting people in custody or deporting them raise constitutional
concerns that make deference less appropriate than in other immigration
cases that do not involve a deprivation of physical liberty.
In Padilla v. Kentucky,54 the Supreme Court said that deportation is
50. See id. at 865–66 (identifying policy expertise and accountability to voters as
justifications for judicial deference).
51. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
52. Das, supra note 48, at 149.
53. Compare Michael Kagan, Does Chevron Have an Immigration Exception?, YALE J.
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-chevron-have-animmigration-exception-by-michael-kagan/, and Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration
Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael-kagan/,
with
Patrick Glen, Response to Kagan on Torres v. Lynch and Immigration Exceptionalism, YALE J.
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 27, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/response-to-kagan-ontorres-v-lynch-and-immigration-exceptionalism-by-patrick-glen/, and Asher Steinberg, Torres
v. Lynch—A Sub Silento Holding on Chevron Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Criminal
Law?,
THE
NARROWEST
GROUNDS
(June
1,
2016),
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/torres-v-lynch-sub-silentio-holding-on.html.
54. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

2016]

SHRINKING THE POST-PLENARY POWER PROBLEM

67

analogous to imprisonment in criminal cases.55 By this logic, it makes
sense that Chevron might have less relevance in cases that involve
grounds of removal or detention of immigrants before they are deported.
Such measures are more analogous to criminal punishment and pre-trial
detention in criminal procedure.56 We do not defer to prosecutors to
interpret criminal statutes the way we defer to the Environmental
Protection Agency to interpret the Clean Water Act.57 Instead, in these
cases criminal procedure might be a better analogy than administrative
law. However, there will be other immigration cases where the
administrative law approach fits much better. This will typically be the
case when there is a much weaker claim that any constitutional liberty is
being infringed. The application of deference in Scialabba v. Cuellar de
Osorio58 might be such a case, since it involved criteria for family
sponsorship visas but did not involve a loss of physical liberty.59
Likewise, some immigration cases may raise foreign affairs and
national security concerns more directly than others. Kerry v. Din
appears to be such an example.60
Disaggregation can be liberating. If we think of “immigration law”
as merely a collection of disaggregated legal systems, then the justices
need not develop a new, unifying theory for all cases involving noncitizens. They need only decide the case in front of them, worrying only
about other cases touching on similar subject matter. Likewise,
immigration law scholars need not worry about proposing a unifying
replacement theory for plenary power. However, there is a catch. The
constant struggle in our system of judicial precedent is to distinguish
cases that are related from those that are not. The temptation will always
be to distinguish doctrines that are inconvenient and to rely on those that
are helpful to achieve a particular objective. Advocates writing briefs
have little choice but to do this. But the task for judges and scholars is to
find coherent ways to actually do the disaggregation. Otherwise, we will
replace one form of incoherency with another.

55. See id. at 361–64.
56. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that pre-trial detention
in criminal cases does not violate the Due Process Clause).
57. Compare Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009) (applying
Chevron deference to EPA interpretation of the Clean Water Act), with United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny standard to statute permitting pre-trial
detention in criminal cases).
58. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
59. See id. at 2196–97.
60. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132–33 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing
a request for a spousal visa from deprivation of life, liberty or property as understood in the
Magna Carta).

